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THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION:
FUGUE OR FUSION? RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND
CHALLENGES IN
INTERNALIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Honourable Justice Louis LeBel*
Gloria Chao**

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose
As the programme guide indicates, the topic of our discussion is “The Rise of
International Law in Canadian Constitutional Litigation.” Over the last decade,
there have been tremendous developments in international law, including the
proliferation of conventional law as well as the establishment of a number of
international criminal and trade law fora. This growth has reverberated through
domestic
law
as
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada.
** Law Clerk to the Honourable Justice Louis LeBel of the Supreme Court of Canada, for the
term 2001-2002. LL.M. (Dalhousie), LL.B.-LL.L. (Ottawa), and B.Com. (British Columbia).

in the past decade, a number of key constitutional law cases have applied principles of international law; such cases have touched on a wide range of topics,
including international trade obligations, 1 war crimes or crimes against humanity,2 possibility of unilateral secession of a province,3 extradition leading to
possible death penalty,4 and deportation of refugees to face possible torture. 5
1

National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324.
R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
3
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
4
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779; Ng, Re, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
858; and United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
5
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1.
2
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The high profile nature of these cases has provoked much debate regarding
the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation or application of international
law. At the heart of the debate is the tension between the democratic principle
underlying the internal legal order and the search for conformity or consistency
with a developing and uncertain external legal order. Some feel the Court has
given undue weight to principles of international law, others believe the Court
should expand on and develop a more principled approach to its use of international law in deciding domestic cases. The purpose of this discussion is to
examine a few of the Court’s key decisions on the topic, highlighting the tension between the two approaches to using international law in constitutional
law cases.
2. Purview
As you may well appreciate, this topic is of boundless potential scope; therefore, we have taken the liberty of appending the subtitle “Fugue or Fusion?
Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International Law” to the
title and limiting ourselves to looking primarily at decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada released in the last decade.
Music enthusiasts may already be aware that the question in the subtitle refers to two different styles of music from two different eras. “Fugue” is the
term for the type of Baroque period music where one or two themes are repeated or imitated by successively entering and interweaving repetitive elements.6 “Fusion” is defined as a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate
elements into a unified whole and is used in contemporary music to denote the
6
“Fugue” is defined by Essentials of Music online (http://www.essentialsof
music.com.) Date accessed: 20 March 2002) as follows:
Polyphonic form popular in the Baroque era in which one or more themes are developed by imitative counterpoint. Example: Bach, Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue in D minor,
Fugue
A fugue is a complex composition in which the theme (called the subject) is developed
by imitative counterpoint. In this example, the first imitation of the subject is heard overlapping the initial idea.
The source Merriam-Webster Online (http://www.m-w.com/home.htm. Date of search: 20 March
2002) defines “fugue” as follows:
Etymology: probably from Italian fuga flight, fugue, from Latin, flight, from fugere
Date: 1597
1 a : a musical composition in which one or two themes are repeated or imitated by successively entering voices and contrapuntally developed in a continuous interweaving of
the voice parts b: something that resembles a fugue especially in interweaving repetitive elements
2 : a disturbed state of consciousness in which the one affected seems to perform acts in
full awareness but upon recovery cannot recollect the deeds
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combination of different styles, most commonly, jazz and rock, to form a new
style.7 A fugue is the metaphor for one approach to the internalization of international law principles: where international law is a separate order from the
domestic legal order and must be formally incorporated in order to ensure an
intersection or interweaving of the two orders of law. Fusion is the metaphor
for another internalization approach: whereby international law informs and
becomes an important part of the domestic legal order, especially in constitutional law cases, in such a manner that although two legal orders are combined,
the resulting decision merges elements of each order into a unified whole.
This discussion examines some of the recent cases heard by the Court on the
topic and attempts to identify which of the two metaphors best describes the
current approach taken by the Court in the internalization of international law.
It is divided into the following parts.
Part I sets out the definition and sources of international law and the uncertainties associated with those sources of law.
Part II examines the application of international law to the Canadian legal
order. This is the main part of our discussion and is divided into two parts.
First, we inquire into the difficulties of internalizing principles and rules of
international law into the domestic legal order, highlighting the increased complexities of doing so in the constitutional law context. Secondly, we discuss the
rise of international law in Canadian constitutional litigation, paying particular
attention to four recent cases decided by the Court: the Finta, Baker,8 Burns
and Suresh cases and noting the various approaches to the use of international
law by the Court.
And finally, Part III makes a few suggestions that, hopefully, might assist the
constitutional litigator in setting out the relevance of any international law
arguments raised before the Court. The thesis underlying this discussion is that
awareness of the pitfalls and misconceptions of the use of international law in
7
“Fusion” is defined by Essentials of Music online (http://www.essentialsof
music.com. Date accessed: 20 March 2002) as follows:
Style that combines jazz improvisation with amplified instruments of rock.
The source Merriam-Webster Online (http://www.m-w.com/home.htm. Date of search: 20
March 2002) defines “fusion” as follows:
Etymology: Latin fusion-, fusio, from fundere
Date: 1555
1 : the act or process of liquefying or rendering plastic by heat
2 : a union by or as if by melting: as a : a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate elements into a unified whole b : a political partnership : COALITION c : popular music
combining different styles (as jazz and rock)
3 : the union of atomic nuclei to form heavier nuclei resulting in the release of enormous
quantities of energy when certain light elements unite
8
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
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constitutional litigation may assist the litigator in attaining a better understanding of its relationship with internal Canadian law. Before we move on to the
discussion, a word of caution appears necessary: these comments do not represent the position of the Supreme Court of Canada, but reflect only our own
views and concerns.

II. DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Historical and Modern Definitions
It is almost trite to say so, but a good part of the debate associated with the
Court’s use of international law in constitutional cases lies in the difficulty of
defining public international law. The notion of public international law has
developed and evolved over a number of centuries.
From the time of the Middle Ages,9 a state-based system of rules formed the
key component of international law. 10 The term began to expand at the end of
the Middle Ages, whereby international organizations, and even individuals
may be subjects of rights conferred and obligations imposed by international
law.11 However, the essence of the state-based definition was still found in the
1625 seminal work of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Libri
iii.12 Considered the father of international law, Grotius presented his general
conception of international law, explaining how the sovereign power could only
be limited by natural law and/or agreements between sovereign states. 13 Given
the importance of Grotius’ work, it is not surprising that modern standard definitions tend to focus on the relations of nations with each other, 14 placing less
emphasis on the rights of individuals under international law.

9
Although the Chinese, Indian, Greek, and Roman cultures evidenced some notions of international relations and rules prior to the Middle Ages, these were applied primarily on a regional
basis and pre-dated the existence of the modern state. See Emanuelli, Droit international public
(1998), at 16-17; Dinh, Droit international public (6e éd., 1999), at 42-46; and Carreau, Droit
international (7e éd., 2001), at 9-14.
10
Dinh, id., at 42-49.
11
Jennings & Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1992), vol. I, at 4.
12
Grotius, The rights of war and peace: in three books wherein are explained the law of nature and nations and the principal points relating to government, trans. J. Barbeyac (1738). See
also Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 19-20; Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations
(1950); and Hamilton, Hugo Grotius: the father of the modern science of international law (1986,
c. 1917).
13
Dinh, supra, note 9, at 55-56.
14
See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, who writes at 1, para. 1:
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Common to both historical and modern definitions is the sharp distinction
between domestic and international law: the latter lacks the constitutional
mechanism to concretize the law. As Ian Brownlie observes:
In the context of international relations the use of the term “formal source” is awkward and misleading since the reader is put in mind of the constitutional machinery
of law-making which exists within states. No such machinery exists for the creation
of rules of international law. Decisions of the International Court, unanimously
supported resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning
matters of law, and important multilateral treaties concerned to codify or develop
rules of international law, are all lacking the quality to bind states generally in the
same way that Acts of Parliament bind the people...15 [Emphasis added.]

Instead, the primary basis of international law is that the “general consent of
states creates rules of general application. The definition of custom in international law is essentially a statement of this principle...”16
2. Key Sources
The key sources of international law that are indicia of such general consent
are found in a number of materials. Paragraph 1 of Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice,17 which sets out the functions of the International Court of Justice, is generally regarded as a complete statement of the
sources of international law: 18
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

Le droit international public peut se définir comme l’ensemble des normes juridiques
qui régissent les rapports entre les membres (États, organisations intergouvernementales) de
la communauté internationale.
See also Brun & Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel (3e éd., 1997), at 3; Combacau Sur,
Droit international public (5e éd., 2001), at 2, where they write:
S. 1 Les relations interétatiques et leur droit - Le premier type de relations
internationales est celui qui soulève le moins de difficultés quant à son identification et à
celle du droit qui lui est applicable.
See further Carreau, supra, note 9, at 19-20, where the author describes the structure of the classical
international society; and Dukelow & Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law (2nd ed., 1995) at
625, who define public international law as follows:
a code of rules which controls the conduct of independent nations in their relations
with one another.
15
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998), at 1-2.
16
Brownlie, id., at 2.
17
As found in the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7.
18
See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 39; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 3; and Jennings & Watts,
supra, note 11, at 24.
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a)

international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b)

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c)

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d)

subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
...

Generally, the principal sources of international law are the first three on the
list: international conventions, customary law, and general principles of law;
however, even these three sources entail some uncertainty as to their application.
International conventions are bilateral or multilateral instruments signed with
obligations and benefits for states or individuals. They generally include, inter
alia treaties, agreements, and covenants, and lend themselves to relatively
straightforward incorporation into domestic law. It is, however, noted that
many of these documents include aspirational declarations, programmes of
action, guidelines, and protocols, also known as “soft law”. 19 Although such
general statements or declarations are useful as they allow obligations to be
formed “in a precise and restrictive form that would not be acceptable in a
binding treaty,”20 by its very nature, “soft law” does not set out how these
principles may be applied in domestic legal orders.21 Rather, since state sovereignty is one of the basic tenets of international public law, 22 there is generally
19
In “New Ways to Make International Environmental Law” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 259, at 269,
Palmer remarks that “soft law” leaves large amounts of discretion to the states: “Frequently, what is
expressed is a series of political statements or values.”
20
Birnie & Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), at 27. See also
VanderZwaag’s comments on the utility of “soft law” in VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine
Environmental Protection Charting a Legal Course Towards Sustainable Development (1995), at
41:
Nevertheless, the creative force of “soft law” principles should not be underestimated... this
twilight realm of international law, “soft law”, has the potential to enlighten and guide law reforms at the international, regional and national levels. As crucibles for further social, economic, political, technological, cultural and scientific thinking, the principles shed light on the
major “spark points” for energizing further legal development. [Emphasis added.]
21
Birnie & Boye, id., at 123, observe that: “What is lacking, however, is any comparable
consensus on the meaning of sustainable development, or how to give it concrete effect in individual cases.”
22
A basic norm of customary international environmental law is that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources so long as no damage is caused to other states. See Trail
Smelter (U.S. v. Canada) (1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. This norm has been reproduced in “soft law”
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no legal impetus for states to implement “soft law” declarations even if they are
a party or signatory to them. Therefore, while these principles are laudable, it is
important to note that they have been criticized for being rather vague, 23 failing
to set out how states may implement them in domestic legal systems.
The second source, customary law, is also difficult to implement in the domestic legal order. A party relying on customary law must meet the two criteria
of consistent international practice and opinio juris24 and must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other
party.25 These criteria require that the party provide wide-sweeping objective
and subjective evidence of the establishment of a custom; this distinction is
problematic as it is often difficult to determine what states believe as opposed
to what they say.26 Contrary state practice can be regarded as either a breach of
an old custom or the seed of a new one. 27 Therefore, unless the impugned custom is formally ratified and adopted into national legislation, it could be difficult to situate the custom in the domestic legal order.
The third key source of international law are the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. This is yet another category whose application
becomes problematic at times. First, it is difficult to define exactly what general
principles of law are, and second, there is no way of identifying who makes up
the group of “civilized nations”,28 now commonly referred to as a community

documents such as the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev.1, reprinted at (1972) 11 I.L.M. 1416,
Principle 21, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 874, Principle 2.
23
See Panjabi, “From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law” (1993) 21 Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y. 215, at 272; and VanderZwaag,
Canada and Marine, supra, note 20, at 38-39.
24
Kindred, Castel, Fleming, Graham, de Mestral, Reif, Vlasic & Williams, International
Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (5th ed., 1993), at 174.
25
See Asylum (Colombia/Peru) case, (1950) I.C.J. Rep. 4 (266), at 14-15 (276-7); and Nicaragua v. United States (Merits) (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 4 (14), at 88 (98), para. 186.
26
Roberts, “Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation” (2001) 95 A.J.I.L. 757, at 757.
27
Roberts, id., at 790.
28
See the dissenting opinion of La Forest J. in R. v. Finta, supra, note 2, at 773, where he
quotes Green, “Canadian Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity” (1988), 59 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 217, at 226:
… a major problem would arise in seeking to ascertain just what is meant by the ‘general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations’. . . . The difficulty lies in determining what are ‘general principles of law’ and what percentage of the world’s States constitutes a sufficient proportion to be considered ‘the community of nations’. Does this
collection have to include every major power or be representative of all the leading legal
systems of the world?
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of nations.29 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts describe this source of
international law as follows:
The legal principles which find a place in all or most of the various national systems of law naturally commend themselves to states for application in the international legal system, as being almost necessarily inherent in any legal system within
the experience of states... The intention is to authorise the Court to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, insofar as they are applicable to relations
of states.30

One subset of this source of law is domestic law, necessitating a comparison
between the different national judicial systems.31 The use of general domestic
principles as principles of international law is not automatic; domestic principles must be “transportable” into international law.32 These principles are
adapted for use into international law over time, as Brownlie explains:
It would be incorrect to assume that tribunals have in practice adopted a mechanical
system of borrowing from domestic law after a census of domestic systems. What
has happened is that international tribunals have employed elements of legal reasoning and private law analogies in order to make the law of nations a viable system for application in a judicial process. Thus, it is impossible, or at least difficult,
for state practice to evolve the rules of procedure and evidence which a court must
employ. An international tribunal chooses, edits, and adapts elements from better
developed systems: the result is a new element of international law the content of
which is influenced historically and logically by domestic law.33 [Emphasis added.]

Although certain domestic general principles occupy an important position
in international law, such as the principle of good faith, equity, estoppel, abuse

29

See Dinh, supra, note 9, at 347, who writes that:
... étant entendu qu’il ne faut pas s’arrêter à la lettre de la formule désuète: «nations
civilisées» - à tort ou à raison, tous les États sont considérés aujourd’hui comme répondant
à cette appellation.
See also Emanuelli, supra, note 9, who writes at 101:
L’expression «principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées» est
héritée d’une époque où les penseurs occidentaux, encouragés par les progrès de la science
et la montée des idées libérales, considéraient certaines nations comme des modèles de civilisation. Elle paraît aujourd’hui dépassée, car elle implique que d’autres nations ne sont pas
civilisées, ce qui, dans le contexte des Nations Unies, est difficilement acceptable. Il
conviendrait plutôt de parler de principes généraux reconnus par l’ensemble des nations.
30
Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 36-37 [footnotes omitted].
31
Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 101.
32
Dinh, supra, note 9, at 348.
33
See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 102; and Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 16.
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of law, unjust enrichment, clean hands doctrine and issue estoppel,34 Jennings
and Watts admit that these principles generally have a limited application:
In thus opening the way for the operation as international law of general principles
of municipal jurisprudence, it must be noted that such principles are in the municipal sphere applied against a background of national laws and procedures. Unless
there is some sufficient counterpart to them in the international sphere, or sufficient
allowance is made for them in abstracting the principles from the various municipal
rules, the operation of the principles as a source of particular rules of international
law will be distorted.35 [Emphasis added.]

Another subset of this source of general principles of international law is
found in the international legal order itself. These principles include: reciprocal
respect of sovereignty, the principle of the continuity of the state, and the principle of the need to exhaust internal mechanisms before resorting to international law.36
Given the uncertainties surrounding the identification and use of these general principles of international law, it is therefore not surprising that the International Court of Justice has “shown considerable discretion in the matter”37 and
has seldom found occasion to prefer the application of “general principles of
law” over that of conventional or customary international law.38
Paragraph 1 of Article 38 is not meant to create a hierarchy of sources, 39
however, there are a number of rules governing interpretation of these sources.
As Brownlie notes:
Source (a) relates to obligations in any case; and presumably a treaty contrary to a
custom or to a general principle part of the jus cogens would be void or voidable.
Again, the interpretation of a treaty may involve resort to general principles of law
or of international law. A treaty may be displaced or amended by a subsequent custom, where such effects are recognized by the subsequent conduct of the parties.40

This concept of jus cogens being a peremptory norm is a comparatively recent development in international law. Therefore, there is no general agreement
34

Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 38.
Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 37 [footnotes omitted].
36
Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 102.
37
Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 16.
38
Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 37-38 [footnotes omitted].
39
See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 119-120; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 3; and also Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, who note at 25 that:
Furthermore, the sources of international law are not self-contained but interrelated, and each
source gives rise to rules which have to be understood against the background of rules deriving from other sources, so that any non-consensual element in one source of law may indirectly affect the rules deriving from other sources.
40
Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 4 [footnotes not included].
35
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on which rules are of a jus cogens character.41 Jus cogens is described by
Brownlie as follows:
Jurists have from time to time attempted to classify rules, or rights and duties, on
the international plane by use of terms like ‘fundamental’ or, in respect to rights,
‘inalienable’ or ‘inherent’. Such classifications have not had much success, but
have intermittently affected the interpretation of treaties by tribunals. In the recent
past some eminent opinions have supported the view that certain overriding principles of international law exist, forming a body of jus cogens.
The major distinguishing feature of such rules is their relative indelibility. They are
rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only
by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect. 42

Jurists have noted that the least controversial examples of the class are the
prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial nondiscrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in
slaves and piracy.43 These examples were confirmed by the International Court
of Justice in the case, Barcelona Traction (Second Phase),44 where the majority
judgment of the ICJ noted that these were not simply obligations of a state
arising vis-à-vis another state, but rather, obligations “towards the international
community as a whole”.
Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 provide that existing or new peremptory norms prevail over treaties. Article 53
defines a peremptory norm as:
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

As the authors Emanuelli and Charles de Visscher point out, the difficulty in
deciding whether a norm is to be considered jus cogens rests in the fact that the

41

Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 7.
Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 514-15 [footnotes not included].
43
See Arbour, Droit international public (3e éd., 1997) at 35; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at
515; and Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 8.
44
See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), (1970)
I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 33, para. 33, where the majority of the ICJ noted that obligations towards the
international community as a whole are those which “...all states can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.” Paragraph 34 set out a similar list of examples
as that found in the text and noted that such obligations can derive from, inter alia, principles, rules,
the body of international law, and international instruments of universal or quasi-universal character.
45
Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37, signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 (acceded
to by Canada on 14 October 1970).
42
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Vienna Convention does not provide criteria for its definition.46 As the establishment of the norms of jus cogens is uncertain, de Visscher aptly concludes
that the proponent of a rule of jus cogens will have a considerable burden of
proof.47
Another uncertainty surrounding the operation of a rule of jus cogens is with
respect to the relationship among the various rules of jus cogens. In particular,
what is the legitimacy of an act done in reliance of one rule of jus cogens but
resulting in a violation of another such rule?48

III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDER
1. Internalization of International Law
(a) General Uncertainties Surrounding Reception
As mentioned above, the three key sources of international law are international conventions, customs and general principles of law. It has been noted
that Canada’s system of receiving international law into the domestic legal
order is neither monist nor dualist; it is a hybrid of the two, demanding the
implementation of conventional international law but allowing for the incorporation of customary international law. 49 As straightforward as this assertion may
appear, it is not without its uncertainties.
First, it is generally agreed that international conventional law does not have
a formal place in the domestic legal order unless it is ratified by the executive
and implemented by the legislature.50 Historically, this two-step process is

46

See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 125; and de Visscher, “Positivisme et «Jus Cogens»” 40
(1971) Rev. D.I.P. 5, at 7, where the author observes:
L’obstacle véritable à l’introduction du jus cogens dans le droit international positif
réside dans son indétermination et, par conséquent, dans son défaut d’effectivité.
47
de Visscher, Théories et réalités en droit international (4e éd., 1970), at 295-96. Discussing the considerable debate over the adopting of Article 53, the author notes at 296:
Par ailleurs – et cette considération a certainement pesé sur le vote final – l’obligation
faite de démontrer que la norme en discussion est non seulement d’application quasi
universelle, mais qu’elle est appliquée en tant qu’impérative, rendra probablement très rare
le recours au jus cogens.
48
Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 8.
49
van Ert, “Using Treaties in Canadian Courts” (2000) 38 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 3, at 4.
50
Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed., 1994), at 396.
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explained by the English parliamentary tradition whereby the sovereign who
negotiates and signs the treaty cannot usurp Parliament’s law-making power.51
Despite this seemingly straight forward reception process, a number of questions arise. First, how does the Court interpret a convention if the implementing
statute only includes parts of the convention? Also, can the Court give any
weight to a convention that has been ratified by the executive but not yet or
incompletely implemented by legislation? Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay remark that though an international convention must generally be incorporated by
legislation, nothing prevents judges from inspiring themselves of the convention in the development of the common law. 52 However, as noted by David
Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Michael Taggart, judicial reliance on a convention that is halfway internalized by the domestic legal system may raise serious
concerns about whether or not it accords with democratic principles and the
fundamental structure of the state:
Courts throughout the common law world have, for some time, given effect to international legal obligations (especially human rights norms) by way of administrative law doctrines and techniques. When the source of the international obligations
constraining executive discretion is a convention ratified by the executive, but not
incorporated by parliament into legislation, traditional alarm bells ring. Such
“backdoor” incorporation seems to amount to executive usurpation of the legislature’s monopoly of law-making authority, or to judicial usurpation of the same, or
to a combination of both.53

Secondly, although customary international law may not require formal implementation, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when a practice or a belief may
be relied upon as a custom. The simple existence of an alleged custom in international law may not be enough for it to be internalized into the domestic legal
order. As Brun and Tremblay remark, a prohibitive custom that is universally
51

See Schabas, “Twenty-five Years of Public International Law at the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev., Commemorative Edition on the 125th Anniversary of the
Supreme Court of Canada, 174-195, at 177, where the author refers to: Arrow River & Tributaries
Slide & Boom Co., Re, [1932] S.C.R. 495, at 510 (per Lamont J.); and Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canada (Radio-Television & Telecommunications Commission), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141
(per Laskin C.J.).
52
Brun & Tremblay, supra, note 14, at 658. See also van Ert, supra, note 49, who writes at
53 that:
Treaty provisions of a purposive, interpretive, or general nature will often be more
susceptible to judicial application by means of the treaty presumption than specific, particular, or detailed commitments, which will usually require implementing legislation to be given domestic legal effect.
53
Dyzenhaus, Hunt & Taggart, “The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation” (2001) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 5, at
5.
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recognized is akin to a rule of common law in the internal legal order; however,
a permissive custom will necessitate legislative incorporation in order to be
admitted into the domestic legal order.54 In general, not all customary law
principles appear to be automatically admitted into domestic law and a number
of outstanding questions remain, including: Which customs prevail in cases of
conflict? Also, which customs become jus cogens? If one incorporates evolving
or developing customs or “soft law” into domestic law, does that not subvert
what has been defined as one of the basic principles of Canadian constitutional
law — the democratic principle?
Thirdly, the incorporation of general principles of law into the domestic legal
order presents its own set of difficulties. As noted above, general principles of
law consist of both international law as well as domestic law from other nations. Although general principles of international law may be incorporated into
domestic law, it is more difficult to conceive of how the domestic general legal
principles of other nations are “incorporated” into the Canadian legal order.
Instead, a more appropriate conception of these general principles of law is to
view them as comparative legal sources. The problems we encounter when
using such principles as guidelines include the difficulty in knowing which
countries present appropriate comparisons and the uncertainty of knowing
exactly how many countries are needed to form a meaningful comparison.
These difficulties of comparative law analyses are discussed further below.
In practical terms, it seems that there is no easy or automatic way of internalizing international law into the domestic legal order. 55 It may be possible to
characterize the reception of international conventions as the interweaving of
two legal orders in a fugue-like fashion and the reception of customary and
general principles of law as more of a fusion of the two orders. However, given
the uncertainties surrounding the internalization of international law, we have
seen that there are numerous exceptions to these general observations. Indeed,
the legitimacy of international law as a source of law in the domestic legal
order will always be scrutinized and called into question.
Therefore, while generally agreeing with the opinions of the authors cited
above, we emphasize that the reception of international law into the Canadian
54

Brun & Tremblay, supra, note 14, at 657-58.
See Knop, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts” (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J.
Int’l L. & Pol. 501, reproduced in “Emerging Challenges: Applications of International Law in
Canadian Courts”, International Law for Canadian Judges: Primer and Approaches, Montréal, QC,
9-12 November 2001, Tab 11, at 506:
... the domestic interpretation of international law is not merely the transmittal of the
international, but a process of translation from international to national. Just as we know
that translation from one language to another requires more than literalness, we must recognize the creativity, and therefore the uncertainty, involved in domestic interpretation.
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legal system must in itself form part of the argument advanced by counsel. In
other words, if parties wish to rely on a certain principle of international law as
a binding obligation, they should endeavour to establish how that principle
became binding and how it applies to their case. This is all the more necessary
when combining two shifting orders of law together: international and constitutional law.
(b) Difficulties of Combining Two Shifting Orders of Law
International law and constitutional law are each politically complex and socially dynamic areas of law in their own right. In using international law to
circumscribe and decide cases in domestic constitutional law, there is an inevitable collision between these two forces. In particular, the principal difficulties
in combining these two shifting orders of law include: the limited nature of
constitutional issues, potential conflicts between presumptions of constitutional
law and those of international law, and the broad scope of international law and
the unwritten principles of the Constitution.56 These problems need to be considered by the constitutional litigator when pleading international law principles
before the Court.
(i) Scope of Constitutional Issues
First, the constitutional litigator must be aware of the potential conflict between the limited nature of constitutional issues and the oftentimes general and
abstract nature of international law. In the case, Moysa v. Alberta (Labour
Relations Board),57 Sopinka J. remarked that:
If the facts of the case do not require that constitutional questions be answered, the
Court will ordinarily not do so. This policy of the Court not to deal with abstract
questions is of particular importance in constitutional matters. See Borowski v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at pp. 363-65.
... To address the questions would require that this Court make pronouncements
well beyond the issues presented in the actual appeal. The adjudication of the actual
dispute does not require the resolution of the abstract questions of law raised in the
constitutional questions. [Emphasis added.]

In the case, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General),58 Sopinka J., again writing for the Court, made the following remarks on mootness:

56
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Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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The doctrine of mootness is an aspect of a general policy or practice that a court
may decline to decide a case which raises merely a hypothetical or abstract question. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the
effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the
parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, the
court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not
only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when the court is
called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly if, subsequent to the initiation of the
action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so
that no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties, the
case is said to be moot. The general policy or practice is enforced in moot cases
unless the court exercises its discretion to depart from its policy or practice....

In other words, the Court limits the scope of its review to the issues at bar
and does not venture into moot questions to satisfy its own or other academic
curiosity. It is true that one may find it difficult to trace a dominant theme or
theory on international law developed in the case law. However, this is not
surprising. Questions of constitutional law affecting international law are
brought before the Court on a fortuitous basis. Therefore, the Court’s pronouncements on these narrow questions are limited to the evidence brought
before the Court. The Court is obliged to respond to each question as it relates
to the particular case and cannot expound on a treatise of law. International law
has traditionally developed in a global manner and is not neatly absorbed by a
domestic court of law charged with answering a narrow question put before it.
(ii) Potential Conflicts between Statutory Interpretation Presumptions
Constitutional law entails many complex statutory interpretation rules. The
legal presumption of validity is characterized by Mr. Justice Barry Strayer of
the Federal Court, Trial Division (now of the Federal Court of Appeal) as follows:
It has long been said by the courts that they will presume an impugned law to be
valid where there is an ambiguity in its scope that would otherwise allow the law to
be characterized either as valid or invalid depending on the meaning ascribed to it.
The presumption is said to apply to lead the court to conclude both that the enacting
legislature intended to stay within its assigned powers and to stay within its assigned geographical territory, unless a contrary interpretation is inevitable. [Emphasis added.]59

59
Strayer J. (as he then was), The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and
Scope of Judicial Review (3rd ed., 1988), at 251-52.
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Also, generally, a legislative provision is to be construed so as to permit it to
serve a useful purpose. As Pierre-André Côté observes:
A corollary of the rule of effectivity favours the interpretation that best promotes
the validity of the enactment, over one that invalidates it.60

There is a possibility that this constitutional law presumption may conflict
with another presumption: implementing legislation is meant to comply with
and give effect to the obligations set out under an international instrument.61
This presumption is rebuttable, though and in the case of a conflict between the
intended meaning of the legislation and the underlying international convention, the legislation prevails.62
These conflicts of presumption seem inevitable when combining two areas
of law which are as dynamic as constitutional and international law.63
(iii) Broad Principles of International Law and Underlying
Constitutional Principles
The broad nature of international law and the uncertain nature of the underlying principles of constitutional law can both add to the complex interplay
between international and constitutional law.
With respect to international law, the Court has had to consider whether it is
at times so broad as to be unconstitutionally vague. In the Finta case, writing
for the majority, Cory J. stated that although it may be argued that international
law is so broad that it is uncertain and therefore, unconstitutionally vague, there
are indicia in international law that indicate the certainty or stability of certain
international legal principles:
In my view, the fact that the entire body of international law is not codified and that
reference must be made to opinions of experts and legal writing in interpreting it
does not in itself make the legislation vague or uncertain. This material is often
helpful in determining the proper interpretations to be given to a statute. Further,
the fact that there may be differences of opinion among international law experts
does not necessarily make the legislation vague. It is ultimately for the court to determine the interpretation that is to be given to a statute...64
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Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed., 2000), at 369.
Sullivan, supra, note 50, at 397. See also Côté, id., at 367-69.
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Sullivan, supra, note 50, at 397 and 463.
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For a detailed discussion on this point, see Puig, “Hiérarchie des normes: du système au
principe” (2001) R.T.D. civ. 749.
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Cory J. relied on principles established in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney
General),65 where it was recognized at page 983 that:
Absolute precision in the law exists rarely, if at all. The question is whether the legislature has provided an intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must
do its work. The task of interpreting how that standard applies in particular instances might always be characterized as having a discretionary element, because
the standard can never specify all the instances in which it applies.

In his minority opinion, La Forest J. wrote, confirming this approach:
To the extent that arguments of vagueness apply to the jurisdiction section... I consider this to be based first of all on a limited view of the nature and content of international law. As Williams and de Mestral, supra, at p. 12, note, even though
there is no comprehensive codification, international law can nevertheless be determined. Given our common law tradition, we should be used to finding the law in
a number of disparate sources... 66

La Forest J. relied on the standard for unconstitutional vagueness set out by
the Court in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society;67 and U.N.A. v. Alberta
(Attorney General),68 and found that the argumentation of international law
based on “the contents of the customary, conventional and comparative sources
provide enough specificity to meet these standards for vagueness.”69
Also, in the Suresh case, the Court considered whether the terms “danger to
the security of Canada” and “terrorism” were unconstitutionally vague. Acknowledging the difficulty of defining value-based international terms, the
Court wrote:
We also accept that the determination of what constitutes a “danger to the security
of Canada” is highly fact-based and political in a general sense. All this suggests a

65

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
Finta, supra, note 2, at 785.
67
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, Gonthier J., at 643, summed up the standard of vagueness as follows:
“a law will be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient
guidance for legal debate”.
68
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, McLachlin J. for the majority wrote, at 930:
... the absence of codification does not mean that a law violates this principle. For
many centuries, most of our crimes were uncodified and were not viewed as violating this
fundamental rule. Nor, conversely, is codification a guarantee that all is made manifest in
the Code. Definition of elements of codified crimes not infrequently requires recourse to
common law concepts: see R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, where the majority of this
Court, per Gonthier J., noted the important role the common law continues to play in the
criminal law.
69
Finta, supra, note 2, at 786.
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broad and flexible approach to national security and, as discussed above, a deferential standard of judicial review... 70 [Emphasis added.]

With respect to terrorism, the Court relied on definitions found in recently
negotiated international instruments on the subject and held that “[w]e are not
persuaded, however, that the term ‘terrorism’ is so unsettled that it cannot set
the proper boundaries of legal adjudication.”71
The interpretation of underlying constitutional principles also presents uncertainties. In Reference re Secession of Quebec,72 the Court held that the animating principles underlying the written document must be subject to a “profound
investigation”73 in order to understand the full meaning and purpose of the
Constitution. These principles include: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law,74 and respect for minorities. As was the case with international legal principles, it appears that the interpretation of underlying
constitutional principles raises the same fugue or fusion question. Indeed, the
Court has set out these two possible approaches in the Secession Reference.
The fugue possibility is found at paragraph 52, where the Court acknowledges that these underlying principles may inspire the interpretation of the
Constitution:
The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres
of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our political institutions. Equally important, observance of and respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing process of constitutional development and evolution of our
Constitution as a “living tree”, to invoke the famous description in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), at p. 136. As this Court indicated in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of
Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, Canadians have long recognized the existence and
importance of unwritten constitutional principles in our system of government.
[Emphasis added.]
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Suresh, supra, note 5, at para. 85.
Suresh, supra, note 5, at para. 96.
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Supra, note 3.
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Id., at para. 148.
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We note that these principles have sometimes been referred to as “unwritten” principles;
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The fusion possibility is also implicitly included as a possible interpretation
approach. In certain circumstances, underlying principles of constitutional law
can create new obligations as described at paragraph 54:
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have “full legal force”, as we described it in the Patriation Reference, supra, at p. 845), which constitute substantive limitations upon
government action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general obligations, or they may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles are not
merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are
binding upon both courts and governments...

Although the Secession Reference does not make explicit reference to a
combining of the underlying constitutional principles with other notions of the
domestic legal order in creating new obligations, we cannot imagine circumstances where these underlying principles could create new obligations of a
“powerful normative force” in isolation from other principles of domestic law.
As with the various sources of international law, some general interpretation
rules govern the underlying principles and the principles explicitly set out in the
Constitution. At paragraph 53, the Court noted that it had cautioned in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island,75 that the recognition of these underlying principles could not be taken
as an invitation to dispense with the written text of the Constitution:
...On the contrary, we confirmed that there are compelling reasons to insist upon
the primacy of our written constitution. A written constitution promotes legal certainty and predictability, and it provides a foundation and a touchstone for the exercise of constitutional judicial review. However, we also observed in the Provincial
Judges Reference that the effect of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 was
to incorporate certain constitutional principles by reference, a point made earlier in
Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at pp. 462-63.
In the Provincial Judges Reference, at para. 104, we determined that the preamble
“invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text”. [Emphasis added.]

Although grounded in constitutional law, 76 these underlying principles of the
Constitution are not easy to apply in a concrete manner.77 The difficulty is seen
75

[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 93 and 104.
For a discussion on the origins of these principles, see Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice,
and Interpretation (1997), Chapter 7 in particular.
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For further discussion, see Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Secession Reference” (1999) 11 N.J.C.L. 65; Walters, “The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91; and R.
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in the recent case of Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v.
New Brunswick.78 Akin to this difficulty is the challenge of applying broad
notions of international customary or “soft law”. It is not without struggle that
the Court attempts to apply these underlying constitutional and international
law notions in domestic cases, mindful of potential charges that its application
could be seen as being political, unprincipled or undemocratic.
2. Rising Use of International Law in Canadian
Constitutional Litigation
(a) Historical Uses of International Law in Canadian Constitutional Cases
The Supreme Court of Canada has a long history of pronouncing on how international law can be used in the determination of constitutional law cases. For
example, as early as 1936, the Court examined the need for treaty obligations to
be transformed into domestic law in conformity with the division of legislative
powers79 and in 1943 the Court considered whether or not it could apply customary international law directly without a formal transformation into domestic
law.80
With the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the number of cases making use of international public law instruments increased dramatically. Writing
on this development in the jurisprudence of the Court, Mr. Justice Gérard La
Forest reported that, between 1984-1996, the Court made use of key international human rights instruments in fifty cases in interpreting the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.81 Since then, that number has doubled. 82 La

Elliot, “References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67.
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2002 SCC 13.
79
The case, Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1936] S.C.R. 461,
was eventually heard by the Privy Council: [1937] A.C. 326.
80
Reference re Powers of Ottawa (City) & Rockcliffe Park (Municipality) to Levy Rates on
Foreign Legations & High Commissioners’ Residences, [1943] S.C.R. 208. For a more detailed
discussion, see Toope, “The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev., Commemorative Edition on the 125th Anniversary of the Supreme Court of Canada, 534 at 537.
81
Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11. See La Forest J., “The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
International Law Issues” (1996) 34 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 89 at 90-91, footnotes 2 and 3, for a list of
these cases; and La Forest J., “The Use of International and Foreign Material in the Supreme Court
of Canada” in Proceedings of the 1988 Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law:
Canada and Europe: An Evolving Relationship Travaux. Conseil canadien de droit international:
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Forest J. thus explained the necessity of taking into account the applicable
international law in Charter cases:
The protection of human rights is not a uniquely Canadian concept and just as the
drafters of the Charter drew on the experience and successes of the international
human rights movement, so too would it be necessary for the Canadian courts to
look abroad.83

The authors, Maxwell Cohen, Q.C. and Ann Bayefsky observe that:
The very fact...that the “supreme law of Canada” represented by the Charter, is indissoluably linked by language and ideology to important international instruments
and principles to which Canada subscribes, assures the inevitability of some resort
to these “external” international legal documents and ideas in order to be certain
that on appropriate occasions the “proper” meaning is given to that Charter.84

Soon after the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court examined
the scope of application of international law in the Canadian legal order in a
number of key cases. In the case, Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicles
Act (British Columbia),85 Lamer J. (as he then was) expressly recognized that
international law and opinion is of use to the courts in elucidating the scope of
fundamental justice:
[Principles of fundamental justice] represent principles which have been recognized
by the common law, the international conventions and by the very fact of entrenchment in the Charter, as essential elements of a system for the administration

82
See Bastarache J., “The Honourable G.V. La Forest’s Use of International and Foreign
Material in the Supreme Court of Canada and His Influence on Foreign Courts” in Johnson et al.,
eds., Gérard V. La Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1997 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal
History Project, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, 2000) 433, at 433-34, where Bastarache J.
remarked that since 1985, in the sole area of human rights, the Court has referred to international
law almost one hundred times.
83
La Forest J., “The Use...” supra, note 81, at 230-31. See also at 231, where La Forest J.
writes:
... it is clear that, from the time then-Minister of Justice, Pierre Trudeau, began his initiative for a Canadian Charter of Rights in 1968, the United Nations International Year of
Human Rights, not only was the United Nations experience influential in his proposals, but
so were the American and European Human Rights documents. Indeed, much of his 1968
proposal for a constitutional human rights document involved a comparison of the approaches taken by the American Bill of Rights and by the European Convention on Human
Rights to the specific rights and freedoms that have subsequently been enshrined in the
Charter.
See also Trudeau, A Canadian Charter of Human Rights (1968), at 10, 16-17, 19-20, 22.
84
Cohen & Bayefsky, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law” (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265, at 267.
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of justice which is founded upon the belief in the dignity and worth of the human
person and the rule of law. [Emphasis added.]86

Also, in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,87 Dickson C.J. observed
at pp. 1056-57 that:
... Canada’s international human rights obligations should inform not only the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the Charter but also the interpretation of what can constitute pressing and substantial s. 1 objectives which
may justify restrictions upon those rights.

Further in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act
(Alberta),88 at p. 348, Dickson C.J., dissenting on another point, stated:
… The various sources of international human rights law — declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals,
customary norms — must, in my opinion, be relevant and persuasive sources for interpretation of the Charter’s provisions.

This approach was confirmed in the 1990 case, R. v. Keegstra.89
In the recent 1998 case, Reference re Secession of Quebec,90 the Court examined the issue of whether or not it could answer a question of international law.
The response of the Court at paragraph 20 confirmed the approach already
taken by the Court:
... this Court would not, in providing an advisory opinion in the context of a reference, be purporting to “act as” or substitute itself for an international tribunal. In
accordance with well accepted principles of international law, this Court’s answer
to Question 2 would not purport to bind any other state or international tribunal that
might subsequently consider a similar question... [Emphasis added.]

As for the contention that the Court, as a domestic court, must examine domestic law rather than international law, the Court confirmed its past practice at
paragraph 22:
...In a number of previous cases, it has been necessary for this Court to look to international law to determine the rights or obligations of some actor within the Canadian legal system. For example, in Reference re Powers to Levy Rates on
Foreign Legations and High Commissioners’ Residences, [1943] S.C.R. 208, the
Court was required to determine whether, taking into account the principles of international law with respect to diplomatic immunity, a municipal council had the
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power to levy rates on certain properties owned by foreign governments. In two
subsequent references, this Court used international law to determine whether the
federal government or a province possessed proprietary rights in certain portions of
the territorial sea and continental shelf (Reference re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792; Reference re Newfoundland
Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86). [Emphasis added.]

In order to ensure that it was not discussing what would be a moot question,
the Court delimited the boundaries of its foray into international law at paragraph 23:
...Question 2 of this Reference does not ask an abstract question of “pure” international law but seeks to determine the legal rights and obligations of the National
Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec, institutions that clearly exist as
part of the Canadian legal order.

(b) Recent Uses and Approaches
(i) Examination of Four Recent Cases
This section examines four recent cases that illustrate how international legal
principles are considered or applied in the domestic legal order. The cases
examined are: Finta, Baker, Burns and Suresh. Although a number of cases
decided in the last decade have considered some important international law
principles, we have limited our discussion to these four cases as they demonstrate a good range of the relationships and complexities between the international and domestic orders of law. This section does not analyze the ratio
decidendi of each decision. Rather, it focusses on the aspects of the decisions
discussing how international law is used in the domestic legal order. Besides
setting out the issues of internalization addressed in each case, we also discuss
whether the Court has taken a fugue or fusion approach to the use of international law.
By the “fugue approach”, we mean to include any case that has treated international legal obligations as separate from domestic ones and has required a
formal intersection or interweaving of international law into the domestic legal
order.
By the “fusion approach”, we refer to those cases that have used international legal obligations to inspire the interpretation of domestic obligations,
resulting in the merging of elements of each order into a unified whole.
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1. R. v. Finta
In the 1994 case, R. v. Finta,91 the respondent, Imre Finta, was charged with
a number of offences, constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes,
pursuant to the domestic Criminal Code,92 for acts allegedly committed in 1944
at or around Szeged, Hungary. This was a very lengthy decision and considered
the application of international law to the domestic criminal legal order to
sanction crimes that were committed outside of Canada. The decision resulted
in a four to three split in favour of the respondent. Our discussion is confined to
the key international law issue that seemed to divide the Court: the standard of
the mens rea requirement for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The majority opinion, written by Cory J., confirmed that s.11(g) of the Charter allows customary international law to form a basis for the prosecution of
war criminals who have violated general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations regardless of when or where the criminal act or omission
took place.93 He seems to have taken a fugue approach to the use of international law in the domestic criminal order as he then went on to observe that:
As Cherif Bassiouni has very properly observed, a war crime or a crime against
humanity is not the same as a domestic offence. (See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes
Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992).) There are fundamentally
important additional elements involved in a war crime or a crime against humanity.94 [Emphasis added.]

Cory J. wrote that the additional element involved in crimes against humanity is that the inhumane acts were based on discrimination against or the persecution of an identifiable group of people. With respect to war crimes, the
additional element is that the actions constitute a violation of the laws of armed
conflict.95 Therefore, Cory J. did not accept the appellant’s argument that proof
of the mens rea with respect to the domestic offences provides the element of
personal fault required for offences under section 7(3.71) and that proof of
further moral culpability is not required.96 He wrote:
I cannot accept that argument. What distinguishes a crime against humanity from
any other criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and
terrible actions which are essential elements of the offence were undertaken in pursuance of a policy of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race.

91
92
93
94
95
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Supra, note 2.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 7(3.76) [am. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 30, s. 1].
Finta, supra, note 2, at 807.
Finta, supra, note 2, at 811.
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With respect to war crimes, the distinguishing feature is that the terrible actions
constituted a violation of the laws of war. Although the term laws of war may appear to be an oxymoron, such laws do exist. War crimes, like crimes against humanity, shock the conscience of all right-thinking people. The offences described in
s. 7(3.71) are thus very different from and far more grievous than any of the underlying offences.

With respect to the mens rea of crimes against humanity and war crimes,
Cory J. seems to suggest that these crimes are largely creations of the international legal order and quite separate from any crimes in the domestic legal
order. Therefore, in order to try these crimes in domestic courts, the approach
to be taken is somewhat fugue-like, maintaining a division between the domestic and international legal orders.
Writing for the dissenting opinion, La Forest J. disagreed with the majority’s
finding that a higher mental element is required for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. He observed that neither the jurisdiction nor the definition
sections of the Code (section 7(3.71) and section 7(3.76) respectively) allude
specifically to a mental element; these sections only refer to behaviour that
constitutes an act or omission that is contrary to international law. 97 In his view,
the lack of express discussion of the mental requirement is “largely because
nobody ever really thought that there was a need for an individual mens rea that
went beyond that required for the basic nature of the conduct, whether that be
murder, assault, robbery or kidnapping.”98 He went on to state that “...it seems
justified to use our established common law rules of mens rea where the international law does not have specific standards.”99
This statement seems to suggest that La Forest J.’s dissenting opinion follows a fusion rather than fugue approach. Although this is not explicitly set out
in his opinion, it is possible to argue that La Forest J.’s approach attempts to
merge elements of the two into a unified fusion. He explained that the standard
set by the majority was too high and not in accordance with domestic law:
In my view, this is far too high a standard; a mens rea need only be found in relation to the individually blameworthy elements of a war crime or crime against humanity, not every single circumstance surrounding it. This approach receives
support in Canadian domestic law. In R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at pp.
964-65, this Court held that reading in such a requirement for every element of an
offence misconstrues and overgeneralizes earlier decisions of this Court.... [Emphasis added.]100
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To further buttress his position, La Forest J. found that not only did Bassiouni, the writer relied on by the majority opinion, not represent the consensus
of legal writers, but that the international law emerging out of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal and the war crimes and crimes against
humanity decisions at Nuremberg did not support the need for a higher mens
rea requirement.101 La Forest J.’s examination of the history of international
law as jus gentium and jus naturalis appears again to suggest that he did not
view international law as an entirely separate and distinct order from domestic
law:
Indeed, as one goes back through the history of international law, knowledge of international law has never been a requirement for culpability. Traditionally, the
western and Christian conception of international law especially in this area can be
seen to coincide with the dictates of natural law; under the Roman Law, for example the jus gentium which was applied to non-Romans was presumed because it coincided with the jus naturalis. In Grotius’ theory of international law, which
applied to all individuals as well, the dictates of international law followed as dictates of natural reason. Piracy or slavery would be contrary to international law as
long as the accused had preyed on ships or traded in slaves, regardless of whether
the pirates or slavedealers were aware of how their conduct was classified under international law. In the international realm as much as the domestic, blameworthiness in criminal law does not consist of knowingly snubbing the law, but rather in
deliberately engaging in certain types of conduct that international law prohibits.102
[Emphasis added.]

2. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)
Possibly the most widely discussed case with respect to the use of international law in a case that did not rely on constitutional law is Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration).103 The appellant, a woman with Canadian-born dependent children, was subject to a deportation order. She applied
for an exemption, based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations
under s. 114(2) of the Immigration Act,104 from the requirement that an application for permanent residence be made from outside Canada. A senior immigration officer replied stating that no sufficient humanitarian and compassionate
reasons warranted the processing of the application in Canada and cited no
reasons for the decision. The issue before the courts was whether the officer
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was required to make the best interests of the appellant’s children a primary
consideration, pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.105 The
Court was divided in a five to two split; the majority allowed the appeal and
relied on, inter alia, a ratified but unincorporated international convention to
inform its analysis, whereas the minority opinion disagreed with the use of an
unincorporated convention in a non-Charter case.
Writing for the majority, L’Heureux-Dubé J. appears to have taken a fusion
approach to the use of international law in this administrative law case.
L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted that although discretionary decisions are generally
given considerable respect,
... that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in
the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the
fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.106

Despite the absence of a mention of international legal norms in this list of
“boundaries”, it appears that the majority decision employed the fusion approach and found that international norms inform the fundamental values of
Canadian law. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. explained:
The principles of the Convention and other international instruments place special
importance on protections for children and childhood, and on particular consideration of their interests, needs, and rights. They help show the values that are central
in determining whether this decision was a reasonable exercise of the H & C [humanitarian and compassionate] power.107 [Emphasis added.]

A number of legal academics seem to confirm that the fusion approach was
taken in these majority reasons. In particular, it has been described as using
international law as “persuasive” rather than binding authority; 108 as “illuminat[ing]” the fundamental values of Canadian society; 109 as “evidence for and
of” such fundamental values;110 and as an application of “treaty presumption.”111
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Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
Baker, supra, note 8, at 855, para. 56.
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Baker, supra, note 8, at 862, para. 71.
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See Knop, supra, note 55, at 505.
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See Dyzenhaus, Hunt & Taggart, supra, note 53, at 15.
110
See Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v.
Canada” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193, who observe at 234 that:
... the obligation [to give primacy to the interests of the children] arises out of a complex confluence of factors that led, in this case, to an overlap between the language of the
statute, which is both evidence for and evidence of “fundamental” Canadian values; the
guidelines, which play basically the same role; and the Convention, whose sheer existence
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Writing for the minority, Iacobucci J. agreed with the reasons and disposition of L’Heureux-Dubé J. apart from the effect of international law on the
exercise of ministerial discretion in a non-constitutional law case. The approach
taken by Iacobucci J. seems to be fugue-like, in keeping the two legal orders
distinct from one another. He found that:
It is a matter of well-settled law that an international convention ratified by the executive branch of government is of no force or effect within the Canadian legal system until such time as its provisions have been incorporated into domestic law by
way of implementing legislation: Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian
Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141. I do not agree with the approach adopted by my colleague... because such an approach is not in accordance
with the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the status of international law within the
domestic legal system.112

Iacobucci J. cautioned against adversely affecting the balance maintained by
the Parliamentary tradition, or inadvertently granting the executive the power to
bind citizens without the necessity of involving the legislative branch. 113
We note that this caution only extends to administrative non-constitutional
law cases. For constitutional law cases, Iacobucci J. indicates that he would
adopt a more fusion-like approach to the application of international law, stating that:
...I am mindful that the result may well have been different had my colleague concluded that the appellant’s claim fell within the ambit of rights protected by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Had this been the case, the Court
would have had an opportunity to consider the application of the interpretive presumption, established by the Court’s decision in Slaight Communications Inc. v.
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, and confirmed in subsequent jurisprudence, that
administrative discretion involving Charter rights be exercised in accordance with
similar international human rights norms.114

3. United States v. Burns
In the 2001 United States v. Burns115 case, the respondents, Burns and Rafay,
both Canadian citizens, were each wanted on three counts of aggravated first
degree murder in the State of Washington. If found guilty, they would face

is evidence of international legal norms and whose ratification without any express reservation is an indication that it too can play the role of evidence for and of fundamental values.
111
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either the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole. The
Minister of Justice for Canada ordered their extradition pursuant to section 25
of the Extradition Act116 without seeking assurances from the United States
under Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United
States of America (amended by an Exchange of Notes) 117 that the death penalty
would not be imposed, or, if imposed, would not be carried out.
In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the appeal should be dismissed
in favour of the respondents. Section 25 of the Extradition Act creates a broad
ministerial discretion whether to surrender a fugitive. The Court held that while
constitutionally valid, the Minister’s discretion is limited by section 7 of the
Charter. The issue was whether the threatened deprivation was in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. Here the Court seems to have adopted
the fusion approach in its use of international law. Among the various domestic
legal considerations, the Court identified a number of international and comparative legal factors favouring extradition only with assurances that the death penalty
would not be sought.
At the international level, the Court considered a number of indicia that the
abolition of the death penalty has emerged as a major Canadian initiative at the
international level and reflects a concern increasingly shared by most of the
world’s democracies, including:
•

Canada’s international advocacy of the abolition of the death penalty itself;118
initiatives to abolish the death penalty on the international level; 119
punishments available to ad hoc international criminal tribunals;120

•
•

116

[Rep. S.C. 1999, c. 18, s. 47].
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and 2000/65.
119
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Affairs Council.
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assurance provisions found in other international documents;121
documents requiring states to refuse extradition in the absence of effective assurances;122 and
the fact that personal characteristics of the fugitive are treated as mitigating factors in death penalty cases. 123

With respect to comparative law factors, the Court took into account the following comparative analyses:
•
•

state practices increasingly favouring the abolition of the death penalty;124 and
a concern in other jurisdictions (the United States and United Kingdom)
of potential wrongful convictions in death penalty cases. 125

Although it seems that the Court took a fusion approach to the use of international law in this case, we note that it did so cautiously. In particular, the Court
did not make a finding that there was an international law norm against the
death penalty, instead, it simply observed that there was enough evidence to
suggest it. It held at paragraph 89 that:
This evidence does not establish an international law norm against the death penalty, or against extradition to face the death penalty. It does show, however, significant movement towards acceptance internationally of a principle of fundamental
justice that Canada has already adopted internally, namely the abolition of capital
punishment. [Emphasis added.]

the International Criminal Court, signed on December 18, 1998 and ratified on July 7, 2000 by
Canada.
121
See paragraph 82 of Burns, supra, note 4, which lists as examples: Article 11 of the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Extradition, Eur. T.S. No. 24, signed December 13, 1957,
which is virtually identical to Article 6 of the Canada-U.S. treaty, and Article 4(d) of the Model
Treaty on Extradition passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1990.
122
See paragraph 84 of Burns, supra, note 4, which cites United Nations Commission on
Human Rights Resolutions 1999/61 (adopted April 28, 1999) and 2000/65 (adopted April 27,
2000).
123
See paragraph 93 of Burns, supra, note 4, which lists as examples: Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, to which Canada is a
party, which prohibits the execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the offence; and Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can.
T.S. 1992 No. 3, which states a similar proposition.
124
The Court relied on statistics provided by Amnesty International of the increasing number
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4. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
In the case, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),126
released earlier this year, the appellant was a Convention refugee from Sri
Lanka who had applied for landed immigrant status. In 1995, the Canadian
government detained him and commenced deportation proceedings on security
grounds, based on the opinion of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
that he was a member and fundraiser of an organization alleged to be engaged
in terrorist activity in Sri Lanka, and whose members are also subject to torture
in Sri Lanka. On the advice of an internal memorandum, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion declaring him to be a danger to the
security of Canada under section 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, concluding
that he should be deported. Although the appellant presented submissions to the
Minister, he had not been provided with a copy of the internal memorandum,
nor was he provided with an opportunity to respond to it. The appellant applied
for judicial review.
In a unanimous decision, the Court allowed the appeal in favour of the appellant, holding that deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to
liberty, security and perhaps life protected by section 7 of the Charter. Consistent with its constitutional law jurisprudence, the Court held that:
The inquiry into the principles of fundamental justice is informed not only by Canadian experience and jurisprudence, but also by international law, including jus
cogens. This takes into account Canada’s international obligations and values as
expressed in “[t]he various sources of international human rights law — declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international
tribunals, [and] customary norms”...127

It appears that the Court took a fusion approach to the use of international
law in the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter as it wrote:
International treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding in Canada unless they
have been incorporated into Canadian law by enactment. However, in seeking the
meaning of the Canadian Constitution, the courts may be informed by international
law. Our concern is not with Canada’s international obligations qua obligations;
rather, our concern is with the principles of fundamental justice. We look to inter-

126
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national law as evidence of these principles and not as controlling in itself. [Emphasis added.]128

However, in doing so, the Court again took a cautious approach to the determination of whether or not a norm constitutes a custom of jus cogens. Noting
the practical and theoretical difficulties of pinpointing when a norm becomes a
peremptory norm,129 the Court chose instead to focus on three indicia that the
prohibition of torture could be considered a norm of jus cogens:
•

a great number of multilateral instruments that explicitly prohibit torture;130
domestic practices of other states;131 and
decisions and writings of international courts and authorities.132

•
•

The Court also noted that Canadian rejection of torture is reflected in the international conventions which Canada has ratified: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights133 and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.134 It held that Article
33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,135 which on its face
does not categorically reject deportation to torture, should not be used to deny
rights that other legal instruments make available to everyone. Taking the
fusion approach, the Court found that international law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake and that
“[t]his is the norm which best informs the content of the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.”136
(ii) Analysis of Approaches: Fugue, Fusion or Hybrid?
With the rise in the use of international law in constitutional law cases, we
see that some cases warranted a fugue approach, such as: the majority decision
in Finta and the minority opinion in Baker; whereas others warranted a fusion
approach, such as the minority opinion in Finta, the majority decision in Baker,
and the Burns and Suresh decisions. We are not suggesting that there is only
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one appropriate approach nor that these are the only two approaches available.
Indeed, it seems that the very nature of the split in the Finta and Baker decisions suggests that perhaps a hybrid approach may be another possible option.
More and more, we are seeing a rise in the use of international law to circumscribe the limits of constitutional law. As Iacobucci J.’s comments in his dissenting opinion in the Baker case suggest, the Charter may be seen as a conduit or
vehicle for international law to be used in the domestic legal order. Despite the
increased use of international law in cases heard by the Court, we note that one of
the key limits to the Court’s use is that it has never seen itself as a final arbiter of
international law. For instance, in both Burns and Suresh, the Court acknowledged that an argument may be made for holding that the prohibition against the
death penalty and torture were notions of jus cogens, but stopped short of making
that conclusion.
We also observe that most of the cases examined above made use of international law in constitutional law cases in a comparative manner, which does not
require that a final determination be made on the ‘state’ of international law. Instead, it seems that comparisons with other jurisdictions has been the method
employed by the Court to assess where the Canadian law stands against other
jurisdictions. A number of recent cases have confirmed the Court’s using of international or comparative law as indicators that inspire or inform domestic law; see
R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd.,137 and Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service
Commission).138
The rise of the use of international law in constitutional law cases before the
Court is not without its challenges; these new challenges are examined below.
3. New Challenges Accompanying Rise of Use of International Law
(a) Need to Accommodate Increasing Number of Parties
Accompanying the steady growth in the use of international law in constitutional cases is the increase in the number of parties pleading principles of international law before the Court, including specialized interveners and amici
137
2001 SCC 70, at paras. 11 and 13 where in his minority reasons, Bastarache J. relied on a
consideration of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to
inform his analysis.
138
2002 SCC 23, at para. 56, where in his majority reasons, Bastarache J. relied on arguments
by the respondents with respect to references to practices in Switzerland, the United States and
Australia as well as international documents including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), to inform his analysis.
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curiae. For example, in the 2001 Burns case, the Court had the benefit of five
interveners:
•
•
•

two were international bodies;
one represented the Senate of another country; and
two were associations of lawyers.139

This is an increase at least in the number of interveners since the last extradition cases heard a decade ago. For example, in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of
Justice),140 and Ng, Re,141 the Court heard arguments from one and two international interveners respectively.142
In the 1999 Baker case, out of five possible interveners, one was an international law intervener.143
And finally, in the Suresh case, decided by the Court in early 2002, there
were eight interveners:144
• two were international bodies and relied on international law principles;
• three were not international bodies but nevertheless relied on international law principles;
• one pleaded using comparative American law; and
• only two did not plead international law principles.
From these recent cases, it appears that the Court has acknowledged the increasingly important role that non-traditional international law actors play in
influencing the development of international law.
(b) Need for International Law Evidence
As the cases involving international matters become more complex, we foresee that there will be an increasing need for international law evidence. The

139
The interveners included Amnesty International, the International Centre for Criminal
Law & Human Rights, the Senate of the Republic of Italy, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, and
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production and tendering of international law evidence in a domestic law case
is a challenging task. As Brownlie notes:
In the first place, there is in fact a serious problem involved in finding reliable evidence on points of international law in the absence of formal proof and resort to the
expert witness. Secondly, issues of public policy and difficulties of obtaining evidence on the larger issues of state relations combine to produce the procedure
whereby the executive is consulted on questions of mixed law and fact...145

The Court has generally relied on published documents, provided by international interveners, to fill this need. As issues grow in complexity, this method
of evidence may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the issues examined
by the Court.
(c) Need for New International and Comparative Law Models
As the argumentation of domestic constitutional law cases continues to look
to international and comparative law sources, there is a need for new international analyses and comparative models to be argued before the Court. What
has been unhelpful in the past are recitations of principles of public international law qua binding law without a discussion on their application in the
domestic legal order. The Court has greeted with skepticism such blanket
statements on the binding nature of international law. Instead, what is needed is
an argument on the relevance of international law principles to the case to be
decided. As international law is generally non-binding or without effective
control mechanisms, it does not suffice to simply state that international law
requires a certain outcome.
Using comparative law in constitutional cases is helpful as it provides an indication of other states’ practices and may shed light on Canadian practices,
especially if the jurisdiction under examination is comparable to that of Canada. Basing himself on the theory set out by E. Lambert, in his Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences,146 the author Alan Watson sees at least three models of
comparative law:
•

descriptive comparative law: an inventory of the systems of the past and
present as a whole as well as individual rules;
comparative history of law: examines ethnological jurisprudence, institutions, folklore, legal sociology, and philosophy of law; and

•

145
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comparative legislation: defines the common link between domestic
doctrines of law.147

Typically, what is argued before the Court belongs to the first category: descriptive comparative law. However, this type of comparative law can be
somewhat limited as it does not shed light on how the principle being compared
can be incorporated into domestic law. Instead, what is sometimes needed is a
more nuanced approach to comparative law. 148 Without the depth of the other
comparative methodologies, it is possible that arguments and therefore judgments may succumb to the pitfalls of comparative law, including: superficial
analyses, misunderstanding and mischaracterizing foreign law, improper or
inappropriate comparisons, and the overgeneralization of complex issues. 149

IV. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Over the past decade, a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada have discussed the application of public international law in constitutional litigation and have situated principles of international law within the
Canadian legal order. As the examination of the cases has shown, there are a
number of challenges that arise with the increased use of international law in
constitutional cases:
•
•

principles of public international law are difficult to define;
the application of principles of international law to constitutional law
cases is cumbersome as there are questions of their legitimacy and the
place they should occupy in or alongside domestic law; and
there are many value-laden terms attached to the use of particular international principles/documents; these do not translate automatically into
legal principles.

•

147
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As our examination of the recent cases indicates, in some cases there was an
interweaving of two separate orders of law in the style of a fugue; in others,
international law was applied in the domestic legal order in a fusion manner.
For those who fear that perhaps a false dichotomy is set up by the subtitle of
this paper, rest assured that we did not intend to hamstring the dialogue by
suggesting that there are only two valid approaches and that one is preferred
over the other; indeed, many cases have used elements of both approaches.
Rather, our intention is to bring attention to these dominant approaches and to
highlight the need to assess how one approach may be more appropriate in a
given case.
In our opinion, as the use of international law continues to rise, the Court
will need more guidance from counsel with respect to the scope and limitations
of international law. In particular, we suggest that the following issues be considered by the constitutional litigator intending to use international law:
•
•

Is this a case where there is a binding obligation? Or is it a value? 150
What is the nature of the binding obligation? Is it based on conventional
law that has been ratified and implemented into domestic law by legislation or a principle of jus cogens?
Is the international law simply a statutory interpretation aid?

•

And of course,
•

Are the international law principles to be applied to the domestic legal
order in a particular case as a fugue or fusion of voices?

Courts should look forward to increased dialogue on this topic.

150

On the need to define the two, see Toope, supra, note 80, at 541.
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